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Notes
FINALITY OF COMMISSION FINDINGS OF FACT UNDER THE FEDErLL
LONGSHOREmAN'S ACT
THE recent case of C-owell v. Beozsn, arising upon appeal from an award
made by a deputy commissioner under the Federal Longshoreman's Act,'
seems somewhat out of line with the growing tendency toward practical
autonomy of administrative tribunals. The Longshoreman's Act provides
that an award shall be set aside only when "not in accordance with lawy." 2
Although there was evidence in the instant case to support the commis-
sioner's finding that an employer-employee relationship existed at the
time of the accident, the District Court entered upon a trial de ?zoro of the
whole issue and reversed the finding and award.3 Despite the objection
that the court had no power to go beyond the finding of the commissioner
-when there was evidence to support it, the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit affirmed this decision on the ground that due process
requires a full hearing on both law and facts before a judicial body.4
The findings of commissions, boards, and administrative tribunals, if
supported by substantial evidence, are almost universally held to be con-
clusive as to issues of fact.5 Such respect is usually paid the findings of
Industrial Accident Commissions under Workmen's Compensation Laws,",
although the propriety of such a procedure has never been finally settled
by the Supreme Court." The issue has been litigated nine times in cases
-44 STA.T. 1424 (1927), 33 U. S. C. A. § 901 et scq. (Supp. 1930).
244 STAT. 1436 (1927), 33 U. S. C. A. § 921 (Supp. 1930).
3 Benson v. Crowell, 33 F. (2d) 137; 38 F. (2d) 306 (S. D. Ala. 1930).
4 Crowell v. Benson, 45 F. (2d) 66 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930).
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific R. R., 222 U. S. 541,
32 Sup. Ct. 108 (1912) (Interstate Commerce Commission); Rankin v.
Hoyt, 4 How. 327 (U. S. 1846) (customs appraiser); Decatur v. Paulding,
14 Pet. 497 (U. S. 1840) (pension board); La Croix v. County Commis-
sioners, 50 Conn. 321 (1882) (licensing board); United States v. Ju Toy,
198 U. S. 253, 25 Sup. Ct. 644 (1905) (immigration official); Public Clear-
ing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 24 Sup. Ct. 789 (1904) (Post Office
Department); Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636 (1881) (Land Office);
United States v. Williams, 278 U. S. 255, 49 Sup. Ct. 97 (1929) (director
of Veteran's Bureau); Murray's Lessees v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., 18 How. 272 (U. S. 1856) (summary process against revenue official).
Note (1929) 14 CORN. L. Q. 250.
6 See Note (1927) 4 WiS. L. Rnv. 236.
7 The acts involved in the only two cases on this precise point which
have come before that body were optional, and although an Iowa statute
which provided for review upon "fundamental and jurisdictional ques-
tions" but denied it on the facts was upheld, Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S.
210, 37 Sup. Ct. 255 (1917), the Court later dodged the same issue by
basing its decision upon an estoppel created by the employer's acceptance
of the act. Booth Fisheries Co. v. Wisconsin Industrial Commission, 271
U. S. 208, 41 Sup. Ct. 491 (1926).
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arising under the Federal Longshoreman's Act 8 and in all except the
instant case a review of the commissioner's finding of fact has been
refused.
The present court concluded that a hearing before a deputy commis-
sioner does not satisfy the due process clause requirement of a hearing on
both facts and law by a "judicial" body. Yet one full hearing, oven be-
fore an administrative body, has been held sufficient to satisfy the clause,
even without the right of court appeal.' 0 And although no workable
standard has been evolved to determine whether a body is administrative or
judicial,"' most courts regard a commission as acting inr a quasi-judicial
capacity and accord their findings the same conclusiveness ordinarily given
those of a jury.' 2 Further difficulty in supporting the instant decision is
encountered when it is recognized that the provision in the Act permitting
the setting aside of an award when "not in accordance with law" has been
interpreted to mean "when based upon an error in or misinterpretation of
a point of law." 13 Yet since the finding in question was as to a certain
precise relationship, the existence of which was necessary to give the com-
missioner jurisdiction over the case, the weight of authority is not as
heavy against the instant decision as would at first appear.14 Only one of
the previous eight cases involved a finding upon such a jurisdictional ques-
tion. Even in those states which make the findings of the commission
conclusive, 15 a wider review is generally allowed upon findings of jurisdic-
tional facts than upon other findings.16 It may perhaps be urged that the
question of jurisdiction often involves a point of law, or the interpretation
of a statute, with which an administrative tribunal is not well qualified to
8 Obrecht-Lynch Corp. v. Clark, 30 F. (2d) 144 (D. Md. 1929) ; Joyce v.
United States Deputy Commissioner, 33 F. (2d) 218 (D. Ate. 1929);
McMahon Sugar Refining Co. v. Norton, 34 F. (2d) 499 (E. D. Pa. 1929);
aff'd, 43 F. (2d) 505 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930); Pocahontas Fuel Co. v. Monahan,
34 F. (2d) 549 (S. D. Me. 1929); Grays Harbor Stevedore Co v. Marshall,
36 F. (2d) 814 (W. D. Wash. 1929); Northwestern Stevedoring Co. v.
Marshall, 41 F. (2d) 28 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930); Wheeling Corrugating Co. v.
McManigal, 41 F. (2d) 593 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930); Zurich General Accident &
Liability Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Marshall, 42 F. (2d) 1010 (W. D. Wash.
1930). See (1929) 43 HAav..L. REv. 131.
9 Murray's Lessees v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., United States
v. Ju Toy, both supra note 5.
10 Ex parte Detroit River Ferry Co., 104 U. S. 519 (1881). See Reotz v.
Michigan, 188 U. S. 505, 509, 23 Sup. Ct. 390, 392 (1903).
"1 See Pillsbury, Administrative Tribunals (1923) 36 HAIIV. L. Rv. 405-
425, 583-592.
12 Mississippi River Power Co. v. Indiana Commission, 289 Ill. 353, 124
N. E. 552 (1919) ; Nega v. Chicago Railways Co., 317 Ill. 482, 148 N. E. 250
(1925) (excellent review of the authorities). Contra: Inland Steel Co. v.
Lambert, 66 Ind. App. 246, 118 N. E. 162 (1917). See Note (1927) 4 Wis.
L. REv. 236.
13 Cases supra note 8.
14 Pocahontas Fuel Co. v. Monahan, supra note 8.
15 Wis. STAT. (1929) 102.23; Cayll v. Waukesha Gas & Electric Co., 172
Wis. 554, 179 N. W. 771 (1920); cf. Laube, Administrative Probleins in
Workmen's Compensation Laws (1925) 3 Wis. L. REv. 65, 83-85.
16 Smelting Co. v. Kemp,.supra note 5, at 641; Bidwell Coal Co. v. David-
son, 187 Iowa 809, 174 N. W. 592 (1919); Martin v. Director General of




cope. But this argument is not particularly persuasive as applied to the
instant case where the jurisdictional question was merely as to the existence
of an employer-employee relationship.-7 To allow review upon such juris-
dictional questions is to retard the speedy administration of justice sought
by the Compensation Acts Is and seems a highly undesirable retrogression.
LIABILITY FOR MISREPRESENTATIONS IN CORPOrMTE PnosPc'russs
THE tort action for fraud and deceit and the equitable claim for rescission
of a contract have developed a specialized sphere of application in the field
of misrepresentations intended to induce the purchase of corporate securi-
ties. ' This is exemplified in the case of Cl~arch v. Wiclzire,2 where the
officers and directors of a corporation, who were also creditors and sub-
stantial stockholders, induced the plaintiff to purchase bonds rcprescnted
by interim certificates entitling the holder to receive first mortgage bonds
of the issuing corporation. The directors represented that the proceeds
of this sale would be used primarily to discharge existing liens, thus
making the bonds in question a first lien upon the corporate assets. The
proceeds were not so used; a prfor lien was foreclosed; and the definitive
bonds proved to be worthless. The plaintiff's complaint alleging theze facts
was held sufficient to maintain an action for damages for fraud.
A security marketing group which kmowingly issues or sanctions the
circulation of a prospectus containing untrue statements of material facts,
the natural tendency of which is to mislead the public, is responsible in
damages to those injured by reliance thereon.3 Scicntcr is not necessary
for liability if facts are represented to be true ag of the author's own
knowledge when he is in fact ignorant thereof.4 Such a marketing group
is liable even if the untrue or fraudulent statements are made by its
salesmen, although this risk may be avoided by a provision in the con-
17 See Gordon, The Relation of Facts to Jurisdictio (1929) 45 L. Q.
REV. 459.
'Is See 18 Ai. LAB. LEG. REv. 231-233 (1928); Smith, Justice aad the
Poor, BULLETIN 13 OF THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF TEACHING (1919) c. 12; Albertsworth, Judicial Review of Administrative
Action (1921) 35 HIARV. L. REV. 127, 153.
'In England liability for untrue statements in prospectuses is governed
by statute. The English Companies Act, 19 & 20 GEo. V, c. 23 (1929).
2 247 N. Y. Supp. 100 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1931).
3 Downey v. Finucane, 205 N. Y. 251, 98 N. E. 391 (1912) ; Hotaling v.
Leach, f26 Misc. 845, 214 N. Y. Supp. 452 (Mun. Ct. 1926); Pennebaker v.
Kimble, 126 Ore. 317, 269 Pac. 981 (1928); EHunCH, PROMOTERS (1916)
c. XI; cf. Hayward v. Leeson, 176 Mass. 310, 57 N. E. 6G (1900) (pro-
moters guilty of fraud for issuing prospectus without disclosing that one
third of the capital stock sought to be sold had been issued to them in pay-
ment of promotion services). But cf. Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust
Co., 64 Misc. 303, 118 N. Y. Supp. 758 (Sup. Ct. 1909) (trust company
organized under New York banking law not liable for misrepresentations
on ground that issuance of prospectus was ultra vires). For the measure
of damages see Reno v. Bull, 226 N. Y. 546, 124 N. E. 144 (1919); Hotaling
v. Leach, 247 N. Y. 84, 159 N. E. 870 (1928) ; (1928) 28 COL. L. REV. 504.
4 Bystrom v. Villard, 175 App. Div. 433, 162 N. Y. Supp. 100 (1st Dep't
1916) ; cf. Meyer v. Amidon, 23 Hun 553 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1881) (fraudulent
intent of author of prospectus may be inferred from falsity of statements
contained therein without other evidence) ; EnRncn, op. cit. supra note 3,
at § 209; 2 WmmLSTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 632.
5 Downey v. Finucane, supra note 3; Hotaling v. Leach & Co., supra note 3;
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tract of sale that the salesman is not authorized to make any representa-
tions not set forth in the writing.6 An initial buyer relying upon a mis-
representation is entitled to a rescission even though such misrepresenta-
tion cannot be regarded as fraudulent.7 Ineffective attempts to block such
a rescission have been made either by phrasing dubious information in the
form of a letter from an officer of the issuing corporation, accompanied by
a statement that such letter is the source of the vendor's knowledge, or by
a disclaimer clause declaring that although the information has been ob-
tained from sources which the vendor deems reliable and upon which it
has relied, its accuracy is not guaranteed nor is it to be regarded as a "rep-
resentation." 8 The corporation, promoter, or other person who supplies
to the marketing group the information used in the prospectus is not re-
sponsible to those relying on it; 9 nor is the issuer of a prospectus re-
sponsible for misrepresentations which induce the purchase of securities
from someone other than the issuer.' 0 Provisions inserted in the con-
tract of sale to estop the purchaser from protesting against misrepresen-
tations will, if given any effect at all, be strictly construed,1 and although
such a stipulation might prevent a rescission in the case of an innocent
misrepresentation," it would probably be inoperative in the case of a
deliberate misstatement.13 Furthermore the provisions against fraudulent
statements contained in the Blue Sky Laws are generally construed to
include every sort of misrepresentation.14 In view of the fact that the
marketing groups are in a strategic position to authenticate the informa-
tion which they disseminate for their own interest, it seems highly de-
sirable that the entire.burden of liability for inaccuracies ormisrepresen-
tations contained therein should be placed upon them.
EHRICH, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 204. Such statement must, of course, be
within the apparent scope of the salesman's authority.
6 Schuster v. North American Hotel Co., 106 Neb. 672, 186 N. W. 87
(1921); Merchant's Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Forsythe, 198 Ky. 334, 248
S. W. 869 (1923); McInerney v. Stores Co., 75 Colo. 31, 223 Pac. 766
(1924) ; cf. Jackson v. State, 210 App. Div. 115, 205 N. Y. Supp. 658 (4th
Dep't 1924); (1925) 25 COL. L. REV. 231.
7 Seneca Wire Co. v. Leach & Co., 247 N. Y. 1, 159 N. E. 700 (1928);
cf. Continental Insurance Co. v. Equitable Trust Co., 127 Misc. 45, 215 N. Y.
Supp. 281 (Sup. Ct. 1926); Alexander Bank v. Equitable Trust Co., 223
App. Div. 24, 22T N. Y. Supp. 403 (1st Dep't 1928).
8 Continental Insurance Co. v. Equitable Trust Co., supra note 7; of. Note
(1927) 75 U. of PA. L. REv. 660. 0
9 Alexander Bank v. Equitable Trust Co., supra note 7.
10 Cheney v. Dickinson, 172 Fed. 109 (C. C. A. 7th, 1909); cf. Hunnewell
v. Duxbury, 154 Mass. 286, 28 N. E. 267 (1891) (plaintiff relied on mis-
statements in certificate filed by defendant corporation with secretary of
state to qualify defendant to do business within state). But of. Hindman
v. First National Bank, 112 Fed. 931 (C. C. A. 6th, 1902) (defendant ex-
pressly. referred plaintiff to certificate filed with state insurance com-
missioner).
11 Jones v. Banker's Trust Co., 239 Fed. 770 (D. N. M. 1916).
12 Brownlie v. Campbell, 5 App. Cas. 925 (1880).
13 Pearson & Son, Ltd. v. Dublin Corporation, [1907J A. C. 351; 2
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1921) § 811.
14 People v. Federated Radio Corporation, 244 N. Y. 33, 154 N. E. 655




PURCHASE OF AN EXCHANGE SEAT BY THE EXCHANGE
EFFORTS on the part of trading groups, bankers and governments to check
violent declines in the prices of securities and commodities dealt in on
various exchanges have become matters of common occurrence during the
past eighteen months.1 A similar effort was recently made by the New
York Hide Exchange to peg the price of membership in the exchange itself
when it fell lower than its liquidating value." The board of governors
determined to buy a seat offered at a distress price without having express
authority for such action. The objection of a member that this action
worked an illegal reduction in membership was overruled by the Appellate
Division in Keeler v. New York Hide Exchange.3
The New York statute limiting the general power of a corporation to
purchase shares of its own stock prohibits only the use of the capital
funds of stock corporations to make such purchases.4 Inferentially, a mem-
bership corporation like the Hide. Exchange may use even its capital funds
for the analogous purpose of buying in one of its memberships.5 And
while by-laws of a stock corporation entitling stockholders at any time to
demand payment for their shares have been held unenforceable,' similar
provisions have been enforced against membership corporations and like
organizations.7 Furthermore many acts or rules of such corporations
which have the effect of reducing the number of outstanding memberships
are freely permitted.8 And under a charter amendment, trustees elected
I WoRL ALANAC (1931) 139.
2 Evidently depreciation in such values has been great. In the three
months from October 1929 seats on the New York Stock Exchange fell
$100,000-16 per cent.
3 231 App. Div. 450, 247 N. Y. Supp. 482 (1st Dep't 1931).
4 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 664; cf. N. Y. STOCK CORPORATION LAW § 3S; Cross
v. Beguelin, 226 App. Div. 349, 235 N. Y. Supp. 336 (1st Dep't 1929),
ajf'd, 252 N. Y. 262, 169 N. E. 378 Z1929); Moses v. Soule, 63 Misc. 203,
118 N. Y. Supp. 410 (Sup. Ct. 1909), aff'd, 136 App. Div. 904, 120 N. Y.
Supp. 1136 (3d Dep't 1909). See generally In re Fechheimer Fishel Co.,
212 Fed. 357 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914).
5 The main distinction between shares in a stock corporation and sharcs
in a membership corporation seems to be that the latter does not entitle the
holder to dividends or profits. N. Y. GENERAL CORPORATioN LAW § 3 (3);
N. Y. MEMBERSHIP CoRPoRATIONs LAW § 2.
6 Picalora v. Gulf Cooperative Co., 68 Misc. 331, 123 N. Y. Supp. 980
(Sup. Ct. 1910); Vercoutere v. Golden State Land Co., 116 Cal. 410, 48
Pac. 375 (1897); cf. Topken, Loring & Schwartz v. Schwartz, 219 N. Y.
206, 163 N. E. 735 (1928).
7 Lindsay v. Arlington Cooperative Ass'n, 186 Mass. 371, 71 N. E. 797
(1904) ; Halbert v. Traders' Live Stock Exchange, 173 Ill. App. 229 (1912) ;
Stationers' and Publishers' Board of Trade v. Flynn, 226 App. Div. 496,
235 N. Y. Supp. 58 (1st Dep't 1929); cf. Gahles' Piano Mfg. Co. v. Berg,
45 Md. 113 (1876).
s § 20 of the Membership Corporations Law allows the by-laws to make
provision for the "voluntary withdrawal, censure, suspension and expulsion
of members" and to provide comprehensively "for the amendment and repeal
thereof." Gf. Belton v. Hatch, 109 N. Y. 593, 17 N. E. 225 (1888) (on
expulsion, membership lapsed, reverted to the exchange); Ketcham v.
Provost, 156 App. Div. 477, 141 N. Y. Supp. 437 (1st Dep't 1913) (ex-
pulsion and resale in discretion of exchange necessary before pledgee can
recover on proceeds of seat); McQuillen v. Real Estate Exchange and
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by an exchange have been allowed, over the objection of remaining mem-
bers, to expend the corporation's funds in the purchase of membership
certificates for retirement or reissue.9 Even the fact that the reduction
of enrollment may prejudice the position of creditors of such an organiza-
tion does not affect the status or duties of any remaining member.'"
Though the obvious and presumably effective precaution of adopting a
by-law authorizing the transaction"' was not here observed, the "entire
management of the property and business" of the exchange and, in all
probability, the power of reducing the membership by expulsion were vested
in the board of governors. In such case there seems little objection to
the power here exercised where such action appears so clearly beneficial to
the parties involved.-
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE TAx ON RADIO RECEIVING SETS
RADIO transmission and reception, declared interstate for purposes of regu-
lation,1 seem destined to bear the interstate stamp for all purposes. The
Washington Supreme Court showed a disposition to adhere rigidly to this
concept in a recent suit under the state Workmen's Compensation law.2
And now a Federal District Court has confirmed the predictions of legal
writers 3 by declaring a state tax upon radio receiving sets unconstitutional
as a burden upon interstate commerce. 4
A South Carolina statutes passed in 1930 imposed an annual license tax
Auction Room, 60 Hun 584, 15 N. Y. Supp. 206 (Sup. Ct. 1891) (on with-
drawal, "stand" (seat), though assigned to another member, reverted to
exchange); In re Hayes, 37 Misc. 264, 75 N. Y. Supp. 312 (Sup. Ct. 1902)
(assignment of seat to exchange for debts due members valid): Ewald
v. New York County Medical Society, 144 App. Div. 82, 128 N. Y. Supp.
886 (1st Dep't 1911) (except under by-law prohibiting resignation under
charges).
9 Tapper v. Boston Chamber of Commerce; 249 Mass. 235, 144 N. E. 89
(1924). There was, express statutory authority for the transaction and
members whose certificates were bought in became sustaining members of
a different class. It was earlier held that the trustees could vote the
certificates so purchased and held against the remaining members. Tapper
v. Boston Chamber of Commerce, 235 Mass. 209, 126 N. E. 464 (1920).
1) Troy Iron & Nail Factory v. Corning, 45 Barb. 231 (1864) ; Tyrrell v.
Washburn, 88 Mass. 466 (1863); Tenney v. New England Protective Ass'n,
37 Vt. 64 (1864).
"Supra notes 7 and 8. Cf. Strong v. Minneapolis Auto Trade Ass'n,
151 Minn. 406, 186 N. W. 800 (1922).
12 The purchase would increase the equity in the exchange property held
by the remaining members, as well as establish a market value for their
seats, discouraging distress sales.
' United States v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 31 F. (2d) 448 (N. D.
Ill. 1929) ; Comment (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 245.
2 Van Dusen v. Dep't of Labor and Industries, 290 Pac. 803 (Wash.
1930) ; (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 488.
3 STATE AND MUNICIPAL REGULATION OF RADIO CommuNICATION (Federal
Radio Commission, 1929) 5 (reprinted in DAVIS, RADIO LAW (1929) c. 5);
Ashby, Legal Aspects of Radio Broadcasting (1930) 1 AIR L. Ruv. 331,
336 ff. See also Logan, The Interstate "Burden Theory" Applied to Air
Transportation (1930) 1 J. of Air LAw 433.
4 Station WBT v. Poulnot, 46 F. (2) 671 (E. D. S. C. 1931).
5 S. C. Acts 1930, 768.
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upon owners of receiving sets, the amount varying with the value thereof,
the proceeds to be used for a state sanatorium. The plaintiff was a broad-
casting station incorporated under New York laws but operating in South
Carolina. The court, for the greater part of its opinion, justified the
plaintiff's right to attack the constitutionality of a tax which in fact was
levied not upon the plaintiff but upon its "customers." G This established,
the invalidity of the statute was declared with brief finality on the ground
that it imposed a tax upon an indispensable interstate instrumentality with
regard to which federal jurisdiction is exclusive.
Interstate business is not immune to state taxes upon property having a
situs within the state,7 nor to charges in the nature of inspection fees,
rental, or compensation for expenses incurred in supervision by the state.3
Beyond that, however, judicial decisions, following the case of Brown -e.
Maryland,! have forbidden any direct imposition in the nature of a "privi-
lege" or "occupation" tax, upon a busines or an adjunct of a businezs
engaged in interstate commerce.20 Furthermore this restriction upon the
state taxing power has been extended by recent holdings that a state may
not even impose an excise upon a commodity sold to be consumed in inter-
state commerce." That the broad principles thus pronounced are of uncer-
tain value in determining specific cases is evident from the apparent vacilla-
tions of the courts 22 and the frequent dissenting opinions.J3 The instant
court, by blandly applying a general statement of "the law," has in effect
declared that, because the control of radio broadcasting is more properly a
subject for federal than for state regulation, it follows that a state is
exceeding its power in taxing the "privilege of owning and operating" a
radio receiving set. Thus the court based its decision upon the arbitrary
label by which the legislature had designated what was actually a "prop-
erty" tax, with the probable intention of avoiding invalidation on the
Although not the basic issue in the case, the element of the plaintiff's
standing might well prove the basis of reversal on appeal. Cf. Kentucky
Independent Oil Co. v. Coleman, 33 S. W. (2d) 615 (Ky. 1930).
7 Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U. S. 275, 39 Sup. Ct. 270 (1919);
Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194, 17 Sup. Ct. 305
(1897).
8 Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 35 Sup. Ct. 140 (1914) ; Atlantic &
Pacific Telegraph Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S. 160, 23 Sup. Ct. 817
(1903) ; St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 148 U. S. 92, 13 Sup. Ct.
485 (1893). But cf. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. v. State Board of
Taxes of N. J., 50 Sup. Ct. 111 (1930); (1930) '39 YALE L. J. 750.
9 12 Wheat. 419 (U. S. 1827).
20 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 30 Sup. Ct. 190
(1909); Stockard v. Morgan, 185 U. S. 27, 22 Sup. Ct. 570 (1901);
COOLEY, CONSTrrUTioNAL LImiTATONS (7th ed. 1930) 68S; Comment (1924)
33 Y- L. J. 406.
1 Helson and Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U. S. 245, 49 Sup. Ct. 279
(1929); United States Airways, Inc. v. Shaw, 43 F. (2d) 148 (W. D. Okla.
1930); (1931) 31 COL. L. REV. 333; (1930) 1 Am L. R]v. 487. See also
Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Asplund, U. S. Daily, Dec. 31, 1930,
at 3304 (N. M. Dist Ct. 1930). Contra: Opinion of Ill. Att'y Gen., U. S.
Daily, Dec. 16, 1930, at 3154.
:-2 See Powell, Indirect Enc;'oachmizent On Federal Authority By the Tacng
Powers of the States (1918) 31 HARv. L. REv. 321, 572, 721, 932; 32 ibid.
234, 334, 634, 902; (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 750.
13 See JUDsoz, TAXATION (2d ed. 1917) 219.
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ground of "double taxation" or "discriminatory burden." 14 Yet even ac-
cepting the statutory label as a proper starting point, courts have not in-
frequently looked to the actual effect upon interstate commerce as a
criterion of tax validity and have accordingly inquired whether the levy
imposed a direct and unreasonable burden.'o Considered in this light, the
instant tax seems unassailable. For radio receiving sets, once in the
hands of listeners-in, are but remotely related to the interstate business of
broadcasting. Essentially local in nature, a tax upon such sets, although
termed a license tax, is in effect not dissimilar to an ordinary excise upon
luxuries. Moreover it can scarcely be argued that the power to levy such a
charge is in fact the "power to destroy" the radio business by destroying
its audience. Nor can it be maintained that the levying state is attempting
to interfere with the federal government's control of interstate broadcast-
ing. The instant court's disregard of all such practical considerations and
its summary disposition of the case are particularly unfortunate in view
of the potential importance of radio sets as a logical source of state revenue.
COMPENSATION FOR CURTAILED PRODUCTION ARISING FRODI
WAR-TIME REQUISITIONS
THE maintenance of the specialized production schedules necessary during
time of war inevitably results in loss to those manufacturers whose produc-
tion is thereby either greatly curtailed or stopped completely by the diver-
sion elsewhere of men, raw materials or power. The proper allocation of
war time "profits" and "loss" has of late evoked much discussion of the
so-called "universal or capital draft" 1 and the facts of the recent case of
International Paper Co. v. United States 2 present one aspect of this prob-
lem. In this case it appeared that a certain paper company was entitled
to divert a named amount of water for power from the intake canal of a
power company. The Federal government requisitioned the total potential
output of the power company and ordered that concern to deliver its maxi-
mum power output to particular war industries. The United States
Supreme Court, reversing the Court of Claims,3 allowed the paper company
to recover prom the government the loss resulting from curtailed production
which followed the cutting off of its power supply.
The Court regarded the requisition of the total potential power output
of the power company as an exercise of war power "in the nature of
eminent domain." 4 The frustration of a private contract through a war-
time requisition of its subject matter has usually been held not to consti-
tute a "taking of property" for which compensation must be madeo. But
the requisition of an actual "res" has been regarded as the taking of
property for which compensation must be paid.6 The court in the principal
14 See Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U. S. 450, 453, 38 Sup. Ct.
373, 375 (1918).
15 See Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 227, 28 Sup. Ct.
638, 640 (1908) ; dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J., in Ozark Pipe Line Corp.
v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555, 567, 45 Sup. Ct. 184, 187 (1925).
1 Cormack, The Universal Draft and Constitutional Limitations, (1930) 3
So. CALIp. L. Rnv. 361; N. Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1931, at 26.
2 51 Sup. Ct. 176 (U. S. 1931).
3 68 Ct. Cl. 414 (1929).
4 Supra note 2, at 176 (per Holmes, J.).
- Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 502, 43 Sup. Ct.
437 (1923).
c Duckett & Co. v. United States, 266 U. S. 149, 45 Sup. Ct. 38 (1924). In
. 992 [Vol. 40
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case found such a "res" in the right to take water from the intake canal.T
This holding was predicated upon New York law declaring such water
rights to be "corporeal hereditaments." 8
Three justices,9 however, dissented without opinion from the position
taken by the court. These dissents may be explained on various grounds.
Possibly the dissenters felt the distinction between the "frustration" of a
contract and the requisition of a "res" to be somewhat tenuous when viewed
in terms of its practical result.10 Or they may have believed that ordinary
rules of compensation in eminent domain not strictly applicable to an exer-
cise of the war power." More probably they recognized that many inter-
ferences with private property rights in time of war go uncompensated
and that only extraordinary interference with such rights, whether the
rights be labeled "real" or "personal" property, should be compensated.12
the absence of express provisions to pay in the act authorizing the requisi-
tion an implied contract must be established. (1923) 36 HAlv. L. RE%. 866.
This includes authorization (1 LEWIS, EBINEN-T DOMAIN (3d ed. 1909) §
66) for an act amounting to a "taking" of property (Cartas v. United
States, 250 U. S. 545, 40 Sup. Ct. 42 (1919); Pitcher v. United States, 1
Ct. Cl. 7 (1863)) plus an intent to take ((1926) 26 COL. L. REV. 625). The
intention is a sufficient basis on which to imply a promise for compensa-
tion. (1927). 1 U. OF CIN. L. REv. 225. Compensation, however, is given
only for "direct" and not "consequential" damages. Crane, J.risdiction
of the United States Court of Claims (1920) 34 HARv. L. REV. 161; Larre-
more, Incidental Danzages to Personal Property in Condcmnation Proceed-
ingg (1911) 11 COL. L. REV. 147. And the taking must be for a public use.
(1904) 4 COL. L. REV. 133.
7 The contention was made that the orders of the Secretary of War, Dec.
28, 1917 and Dec. 29, 1917, requisitioning the power, plus the subsequent
waiver by the power company of rights for compensation against the govern-
ment, constituted an arrangement by contract and not an act of conscrip-
tion. This seems untenable. Liggitt & Meyers Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 274 U. S. 215, 47 Sup. Ct. 581 (1927) (government placed a manda-
tory order for tobacco which the company signed; it was held not to be a
contract or commercial order as there had been an initial act of requisi-
tion).
8 Cf. Columbia Water Power Co. v. Columbia Electric Street Railway,
Light & Power Co., 43 S. C. 154, 20 S. E. 1002 (1895). But cf. First Con-
struction Co. v. State, 221 N. Y. 295, 116 N. E. 1020 (1917). It was also
argued that the government merely revoked a license by its requisition. It
is true the licenses to withdraw water were revocable. 34 STAT. 606 (190) ;
40 STAT. 633 (1918). But the Government did not proceed on this theory.
Instead the rights of the Power company were recognized. Moreover the
license was to divert water, while the power was requisitioned. This
presupposes the continued existence of the license.
s Justices MacReynolds, Stone, and Roberts.
10 While if a contract is "frustrated" no compensation is allowed (mipra
note 5) if the contract is "actually" taken (Long Island Water Supply Co. v.
Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685, 17 Sup. Ct. 718 (1897)) or expressly condemned
(Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 13 Sup. Ct.
622 (1893)) compensation is allowed.
11 Cf. Cohen, Concerning the Power of thw United States in War Tinze
as to Taking Property (1919) 53 Am. L. REV. 87; Black, The Theory of
the War Power Under the Constitution (1926) 60 AM. L. REV. 31. The
Universal Draft, mentioned infra, note 12, must be validated on this, if any,
constitutional theory.
12 A bill was proposed in the Senate, Jan. 25, 1930, by United States
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Indeed it does seem somewhat anomalous to allow the paper company to
recover if its production is checked by cutting off its flow of water power
when it probably could not recover if its production were checked by cutting
off its flow of electrical power or raw materials which another had con-
tracted to supply.13
LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS AS A MEANS OF SECURING THE SOLVENCY OF BANI(S
T iE importance of the banking business in the modern community has led
to various types of legislation designed to secure protection against the in-
solvency of banks.1 One means attempted has been preventive and remedial
statutes imposing penal 2 and civil 3 liability upon bank directors for any
neglect of duty or knowledge of and assent to a violation of the banking
laws. Another such effort has taken the form of purely remedial statute,4
creating a Depositors Guarantee Fund 4 to insure relief after insolvency,
In the recent case of People v. Mancuso,- a demurrer to an indictment raised
the question of the constitutionality of a New York statute of the preventive
type which declared participation by a bank officer or director in fraudulent
insolvency to be a crime, and defined insolvency as fraudulent "unless [the
bank's] affairs appear, upon investigation to have been administered fairly
and legally and with the same care and diligence that agents receiving
compensation for their services are bound by law to observe." 13 The lower
courts sustained the demurrer on the authority of Manley it. Georgia,' in
Senator C. C. Dill of the State of Washington for a proposed universal
capital draft. 72 CONG. REC. 2449 (1930).
13 See supra note 5.
1 Federal Reserve Act, 38 STAT. 251 (1913), 12 U. S. C. § § 221 ff. (1926);
see 1 PATON'S DIGEST 831 (1926) for amendment; National Banking Acts,
ibid. 891; statutes affecting supervision, ibid. 1023.
2 KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) 9-137; N. J. COAIP. STAT. (Supp. 1930)
17-14; N. M. CoIP. STAT. (1929) 13-601; N. Y. PENAL LAW, c. 41, §§ 290,
295, 305; N. C. CODE (1927) § 224; ORE. CODE (1930) 22-1501-1511. See
Agnew v. United States, 165 U. S. 36, 17 Sup. Ct. 235 (1897); Spurr v.
United States, 174 U. S. 728, 19, Sup. Ct. 812 (1899) ; of. Easton v. Iowa,
188 U. S. 220, 23 Sup. Ct. 288 (1903) (Iowa statute making receipt of a
deposit after insolvency with knowledge of the insolvency a felony held
invalid insofar as it applied to officers of national banks).
3N. C. CODE (1927) § 221e; N. M. Co ip. STAT. (1929) 13-147; S. C. CoVE
(1922) § 3973; ef. Daniels v. Berry, 146 S. E. 420 (S. C. 1929); (1929) 13
MINN. L. REV. 607; (1930) 16 VA. L. REV. 277; (1929) 38 YALE L. J.
1142. See also Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 131, 11 Sup. Ct. 924 (1891);
Bowerman v. Hamner, 250 U. S. 504, 39 Sup. Ct. 549 (1919), (1920) 4
MINN. L. REV. 232; Hun v. Cary, 82 N. Y. 65 (1880); Lippitt v. Ashley, 89
Conn. 451, 94 Atl. 995 (1915); Rankin v. Cooper, 149 Fed. 1010 (C. C. W.
D. Ark. 1907) ; Harris v. Pearsall, 116 Misc. 366, 190 N. Y. Supp. 61 (Sup.
Ct. 1921) (cases dealing with directors' liability to the bank for negligence,
and the degree of care and diligence necessary).
4 OKLA. Coip. STAT. (1921) c. 34; KAN. REV. STAT, ANN. (1923) c. 9;
NEB. CoMlP. STAT. (1922) § 8028. See Butts, Guaranty of Bank Deposits
in Eight States (1931) 3 Miss. L. J. 186.
5N. Y. L. J., Feb. 27, 1931.
6 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 297. Two other states have statutes almost identi-
cal with that of New York: ORE. CODE (1930) 22-1507; S. D. CoiP. LAWS
(1929) §§ 4288, 4289.
7 279 U. S. 1, 49 Sup. Ct. 215 (1929); (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 1145; (1929)
NOTES
which the United States Supreme Court had held unconstitutional a similar
Georgia statute making every insolvency fraudulent but allowing a bank
officer to rebut the "presumption of fraud" by a showing that the affairs of
the bank were properly administered.8 The New York Court of Appeals
overruled the demurrer on the ground that in the present case the "pre-
sumption of fraud," if it existed, was severable from the otherwise valid defi-
nition of fraudulent insolvency.9
A year before the M.anley case the Supreme Court, in Fcrry v,. Ransc 0,
upheld a Kansas statute 11 which imposed civil liability on a bank director
knowing of and assenting to recipt of a deposit after insolvency, and raised
a prima facie presumption of such knowledge and assent from the fact of
insolvency. Apparently the more remedial statutes attempting to hold di-
rectors civilly liable are less apt to be checked in their enforcement by the
legal concept of presumption than the preventive statutes dealt with in
Manley v. Georgia and the principal case. The purpose of civil liability
statutes is not exclusively remedial, however, since they tend indirectly to
prevent insolvency by stimulating directors to greater activity.22
'While the device of the Depositors Guarantee Fund is, on the other hand,
more clearly remedial, in that it operates to prevent insolvency only inci-
dentally, as a practical matter it has not been successful in affording
security to depositors.' 3 The imposition of penal liability is definitely a step
13 MARQ. L. RBu. 244; (1929) 27 IIcH. L. REV. 951; (1929) 13 31INN. L.
Ruv. 727.
s GA. AN. CODE (Penal Code 1926) § 211 (28). The presumption may
be rebutted by showing that the affairs of the bank have been "fairly and
legally administered and, generally, with the same care and diligence that
agents receiving a commission for their services are required and bound by
law to observe." Note that the phraseology is almost identical with that
used in the New York statute, supra note 6.
9 Supra note 5. In a concurring opinion Lehman, J., argued that the pre-
sumption, if it could be found in the statute, applied only to whether there
was fraudulent insolvency, and not to the defendant's participation in the
crime. Kellog, J., and O'Brien, J., dissented from the majority on the
grounds that the definition of fraudulent insolvency, without including the
invalid presumption, was too vague and indefinite to form the basis of a
criminal offense, and that the presumption clause could not be included
without virtually rewriting the statute.
10 277 U. S. 88, 48 Sup. Ct. 443 (1928); (1928) 7. N. C. L. RBu. 62;
(1927) 13 VA. L. REv. 494.
n KAx. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 9, § 163-164; cf. N. 3I. CouP. STAT.
(1929) 13-142.
12 This close functional relationship between civil and penal liability is
well illustrated by a hybrid Nebraska statute permitting liability for double
damages to anyone injured by a deception practiced by a corporation. NED.
CouP. STAT. (1929) 24-217; cf. NEV. REV. LAWS (1912) § 1176 (corporation
officer making a false book entry or refusing to exhibit the books, declared
guilty of a misdemeanor and required to pay to the party injured a penalty
of $100 and all damages resulting therefrom). See also IyIe v. Bailey, 5
S. W. (2d) 50 (1o. 1928); Metzger v. Joseph, 111 Aliss. 385, 71 So. 045
(1916) ; cf. Gaiser v. Buck, 174 N. E. 83 (Ind. 1930) (upholding statutory
double liability of bank stockholder to depositor).
13 See Butts, op. cit. supra note 4. Legislation creating a Depositors'
Guaranty Fund has been upheld by the Supreme Court. See Noble State
Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 486 (1911) ; Abie State Bank v.
Weaver, 227 N. W. 922 (Neb. 1929), aff'd, 51 Sup. Ct. 252 (U. S. 1931);
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toward the enforcement of the fiduciary character of the directors' rela-
tionship to the depositors and to the bank, and consequently moves more
directly toward the ultimate goal, the continued solvency of banks, The
chief handicap to this method is the danger that presumptions facilitating
the imposition of criminal liability may be more readily held unconstitu-
tional.' 4 Since the realm of invalid presumptions is but vaguely defined,5
and since the New York statute did not in express words create a pre-
sumption as did the Georgia statute condemned in Manley v. Georgia, the
decision in the instant case would seem justified, especially in view of the
significance of the legislative attempt to require bank directors to assume
a responsible as well as an ornamental position.
CONSENT RECEIVERSHIPS FOR AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS
T wo recent federal cases, Municipal Financial Corporation v. Bankus Corpo-
ration and Municipal Financial Corporation v. City Financial Corporation,'
present the interesting question as to the circumstances under which a
court of equity will entertain a consent receivership when a close inter-
corporate relationship exists between, the plaintiff and the defendant. Sep-
arate suits, typical creditor's bills, were brought by the plaintiff, and the
defendants filed answers joining in the prayer for relief contained in the
complaints and consenting to the appointment of a receiver. A receiver
was appointed and at the court's request a preliminary investigation of the
financial condition of the defendants was undertaken. The investigation
disclosed that somewhat more than ninety-nine per cent of the stock of the
plaintiff was owned by the defendants. On the basis of this and other
disclosures, 2 the receivership was terminated.
Although technically the two suits alleged grounds for an equity receiver-
ship as ancillary to independent causes of action, the parties were, in
effect, one corporation, and the appointment was apparently the sole purpose
to be achieved.3 Where such a suit is bona fide and will obviously operate
Langford v. Platte Iron Works Co., 235 U. S. 461, 35 Sup. Ct. 113 (1915).
14 Manley v. Georgia, supra note 7; cf. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219,
31 Sup. Ct. 145 (1910).
15 Cf. Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City R. R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S, 35,
31 Sup. Ct. 136 (1910); Bailey v. Alabama, supra note 14; McFarland v.
American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U. S. 79, 36 Sup. Ct. 498 (1916) ; Manley
v. State, 166 Ga. 563, 144 S. E. 178 (1928); Manley v. Georgia, supra
note 7; Western & A. R. R. v. Henderson, 279 U. S. 639, 49 Sup. Ct. 445
(1929); Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Shaw, 149 S. E. 657 (Ga. 1929). See
(1929) 17 CALIF. L. REv. 565, 580; (1929) 43 HARv. L. REV. 100; (1930) 24
ILL. L. REV. 689; (1929) 7 N. C. L. REv. 453; (1929) 8 N. C. L. REV. 50; (1930)
8 N. C. L. REv. 205.
145 F. (2d) 902 (S. D. N. Y. 1930) (cases reported together). All the
parties involved were affiliates of the Bank of the United States.
2 The defendant in the first suit owned slightly more than ninety-nine per
cent of the stock of the defendant in the second suit. In addition there
were fourteen subsidiaries wholly owned by the defendants, and a smaller
number in which they had partial control. Except for $14,000 the defend-
ants were substantially without free assets. Although there were some
valuable equities in real estate and other assets owned by the defendants
or their subsidiaries, heavy cash requirements were necessary to conserve
the equities, and the other assets were held under claim of pledge requir-
ing proceedings for their recovery. The receiver reported that there were
not even sufficient funds for a study of the situation. Ibid. 901-906.
3 A receivership is merely an ancillary and incidental remedy. Pusey
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to the advantage of creditors, the granting of a moratorium enabling a
corporation to gather its resources commends itself.4 But there is sub-
stantial authority to the contrary.3 Of course, where the appointment is
desired, either at the suit of the corporation or of a creditor with the
cooperation of the corporation, merely as a ruse for holding other creditors
at arm's length, there is no equitable basis for a receivership.O Acquiescence
between the contending parties in the appointment does not necessarily show
collusion but where, as in the instant cases, the plaintiff is controlled by
the defendant, the suit will probably be very carefully scrutinized. 7
It is fundamental that an equity receivership will not be decreed when
another equally adequate and appropriate remedy is available.8 Thus, an
appointment has been denied where the plaintiff's rights would be fully pro-
tected by means of an injunction,0 or by enforcing a lien,'0 or by attach-
ment proceedings.1 Moreover, a receiver will not be appointed unless the
court is satisfied that the purpose for which the remedy is sought may be
accomplished.- The complicated and unliquid situation disclosed by the
record in the instant cases 13 would seem to render the successful issue of a
receivership sufficiently improbable to justify its termination irrespective
of the inter-corporate character of the parties.
1 4
& Jones v. Hanssen, 261 U. S. 491, 43 Sup. Ct. 454 (1023) ; Bricton Manu-
facturing Co. v. Close, 280 Fed. 297 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922); 1 CLARK, RE-
CEI S (2d ed. 1929) § 51. See, on the jurisdiction of equity to grant a
receiver where no other relief is sought, (1917) 30 HA Rv. L. REV. 273.
4 Cf. Scattergood v. American Pipe & Construction Co., 247 Fed. 712 (E.
D. Pa. 1917), ajf'd, 249 Fed. 23 (C. C. A. 3d, 1918).
Hitchcock v. American Pipe & Construction Co., 89 N. J. Eq. 440, 105
Atl. 655 (1918) (Lane, V. C., said: "But I have never, unless the instant
case is an exception, heard of a case in which it was contended that a court
of equity might by judicial fiat prescribe a moratorium in favor of a corpo-
ration"); State ex rel. Merriam v. Ross, 122 Mo. 435, 25 S. W. 947 (1894);
CL,4R, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 74.
6 See Schloss v. Schloss, 14 App. Div. 333, 337, 43 N..Y. Supp. 788, 791
(1st Dep't 1897) ; Gutterson & Gould v. Lebanon Iron & Steel Co., 151 Fed.
72, 74 (C. C. Ml. D. Penn. 1907).
7 Cf. Caldwell v. Dean, 10 F. (2d) 299 (C. C. A. 5th, 1925). The court
in the instant cases commented unfavorably on the defendants' conduct in
summoning their subsidiary incorporated in Delaware to bring suit so
as to secure a federal jurisdiction in equity on the ground of diversity of
citizenship. Cf. Harkins v. Brundage, 276 U. S. 36, 48 Sup. Ct. 268 (1928)
(defendant corporation drummed up a non-resident corporate creditor and
persuaded it to file a creditor's bill in equity in the federal court to fore-
stall a receivership in a state court stockholder's suit), noted in (1928) 41
HARv. L. Rnv. 804.
8 Greasy Creek Coal & Land Co. v. Greasy Creek Coal Co., 196 Ky. 67,
244 S. W. 85 (1922); Tedder v. Tedder, 109 S. C. 451, 96 S. E. 157 (1918);
1 SAIrrH, RECEIVERS (Tardy's ed. 1920) § 8.
9 Montana Ranches Co. v. Dolan, 53 Mont. 397, 164 Pac. 306 (1917);
Empire Hotel Co. v. Mlain, 98 Ga. 176, 25 S. E. 413 (1896).
1 'Elkhorn Hazard Coal Co. v. Fairchild, 191 Ky. 276, 230 S. W. 61 (1921).
u Gabbert v. Union Gas & Traction Co., 140 Mo. App. 6, 123 S. W. 1024
(1909).
12 .Jones M axwell Motor Co., 13 Del. Ch. 76, 115 Atl. 312 (1921).
1 Supra note 2. Cf. Mercantile Investment & General Trust Co. v.
River Plate Trust, Loan & Agency Co., [1892] 2 Ch. 303; Grand Falls Mu-
tual Irrigation Co. v. White, 131 S. W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910).
:14 It is interesting to note that the defendants, following the suggestion of
the court, later filed voluntary petitions in bankruptcy. Matter of Bankus
Corporation and Matter of City Financial Corporation, 45 F. (2d) 907
- (S. D. N. Y. 1930).
